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Scepticism: The End of the Road
 
The direct way to promote scepticism is to take a Cartesian sceptical hypothesis (H) and 
argue that nothing is known (~Kp) since H is true. 
IA 1. H
2. H entails ~Kp (definition)
3. ~Kp
This Argument For Ignorance (IA), as it might be called, is indefensible since H entails that it 
can never be known. That is more of a pragmatic, procedural objection to scepticism, however, 
than a substantive refutation, since scepticism might be true even if it is indefensible. It is this 
modal dimension of the problem that philosophers have found most troubling.1 If it means 
anything more than that the sceptical hypothesis is not logically inconsistent, it must be that it is 
not known to be false (~K~H). That, really, is the sceptic's only alternative to arguing that H is 
true—that it might be true and is not known to be false. The defense of scepticism can then 
continue as follows: since H entails ~Kp, ~K~H entails that it is not known that anything is 
known, ~K~(~Kp) (ie. ~KKp), in accordance with the principle that knowledge is closed under 
entailment (CP), hence that nothing is known, ~Kp, in accordance with the principle that Kp is 
virtually equivalent to KKp (KK). 
1 Pritchard (2005) says that the modal dimension of the sceptic's conclusion is what makes it so 
troubling: '... regardless of whether we are ... the victim of a sceptical hypothesis, it remains 
that we do not know ... everyday propositions ...' (p2) He means that the mere possibility of H 
implies that we know nothing (~Kp). 
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AI 1.  ~K~H
2.  H entails ~Kp  (definition)
3.  ~KKp (CP)
4.  ~Kp             (KK)
This has been called the Argument From Ignorance (DeRose, 1995) because it opens quietly with
a demurrer instead of an affirmation of H, more in keeping with scepticism's spirit of 
agnosticism. Yet while it begins thus unassumingly with a shift of modality, thus avoiding the 
charge of indefensibility, AI still somehow manages to produce the sceptical conclusion at the 
end—the very thing it was supposed to get around the problem of arguing directly for. How is it 
possible to get ~Kp from ~K~H and ~KKp, when we know a priori that any argument for ~Kp is
self-defeating? 
If it looks like a mouse has come into being by spontaneous generation out of grey rags 
and dust, we would do well (says Wittgenstein) to examine the rags carefully to see how a mouse
may have hidden in them. Here the mouse is hiding in the rules of inference—not CP, but KK. 
The whole argument (AI) from ~K~H to ~KKp to ~Kp runs counter to the principle of the virtual
equivalence of Kp and KKp (KK), which is supposed to justify the last step. The standard 
interpretation of KK is that Kp is defensible iff KKp is defensible, and equally that ~Kp is 
indefensible iff ~KKp is indefensible. But ~Kp is the sceptical thesis; so ~KKp must be as 
indefensible as ~Kp. If (on the other hand) KK is not valid, one can well argue for ~KKp via 
~K~H  even if one cannot argue for ~Kp directly via H; but there is then no justification for the 
last step from ~KKp back to ~Kp. In short, AI relies on a rule of inference (KK) at the end that it 
presupposes is invalid to begin with. That puts an end to the intuition that scepticism might be 
true, even though it is indefensible. It comes to nought.
~K~H is a pseudo-sceptical hypothesis. It is a philosophical missile with a dummy 
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warhead (~KKp): the sceptic can arm the warhead by hooking it up to ~Kp by KK, but then it is 
too heavy with implication, as it were, to be delivered by ~K~H. ~KKp can be delivered only if 
it has no explosive implications. It is thus perfectly compatible with the knowledge-claims of 
philosophers like Moore. That is the position at any rate that Moore staked out at the end of 
Proof of an External World, where he claimed that he knew that 'here is one hand and here is 
another' (P), while conceding that he could not prove it to be true without proving that he was 
not dreaming, which he did not think he could do (Moore, 1959, p147). He was in effect 
claiming both KP and ~K~H. It has been called an 'abominable conjunction' (DeRose 1995, 
p28), but it is a defensible form of fallibilism, defined here as the view that knowing (Kp) is 
compatible with not knowing that scepticism is false (~K~H) and not knowing that we know 
(~KKp). We can know things even though we do not know we are not dreaming or deceived—
KP and ~K~H—because the mere possibility of mistake and error (~K~H) has no sceptical 
implications. Knowing implies that we are not mistaken (~H), not that we know we are not 
(K~H). (It implies that we are not mistaken, not that we cannot be.)
 It is a mistake to try to build the impossibility of mistake (K~H) into the definition of 
knowledge (Kp). It is the main reason scepticism lingers in the literatrue. KP seems to entail 
K~H and that allows the construction of the second premise (~K~H → ~Kp) of an abbreviated 
form of AI (AI*), which has become the standard form of AI (Black 2002, p148; Byrne 2004, 
p303; DeRose 1996, p1; Dretske 2014, p23; Lewis 1996, p564, Pritchard 2002, p217; Prtichard 
2008; Pryor 2000 p521-2; Rysiew 2016, Sec.3.1; Schaffer 2004, p138; Unger 1971, 1975):
AI* 1. No one knows that H is not the case [~K~H]
2. If no one knows that H is not the case, no one knows that P  [~K~H → ~KP]
3. No one knows that P  [~KP]
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The second premise is a hyper-sceptical misstatement of the terms of the argument. It is H, not 
~K~H, that entails ~KP. KP entails ~H, not K~H. If we know anything, H is false—not 
necessarily known to be false, just false. It is possible to know something (KP) without knowing 
we are not dreaming or being deceived (~K~H), as long as we are not dreaming or being 
deceived. (Moore's position at the end of PEW.) KP does not entail K~H.(or KH or for that 
matter). Why should we have to know that H is false (K~H) in order to know anything (Kp)? 
(Who needs to know?) If we do not know (~K~H), all that follows is that we do not know that 
we know (~KKp), not that we do not know (~Kp).
 One reason ~K~H seems to entail ~Kp is that the simplest sceptical hypothesis seems to 
be just the negation of what anyone claims. (~p entails ~Kp, so substituting ~p for 'H' in '~K~H' 
yields '~K~(~p)', ie. ~Kp.) Of course there is no arguing directly that nothing is known on the 
grounds that nothing is true—that would be the direct, IA argument, which is self-defeating; and 
the indirect AI argument, ~K~(~p), ergo ~Kp, begs the question in a straightforward way (pet. 
prin. repetitione). As we learned from The Argument Clinic, an argument is not simply 
gainsaying what someone says—('It can be', 'No, it can't')—and an argument for scepticism 
cannot simply be the denial of what anyone claims to know. To have any bite the 'not-p' sceptical 
hypothesis has to be a proposition that entails the negation of what we claim to know other than 
the plain negation of what we claim to know. It has to be, as Lewis puts it, 'a certain possibility in
which not-P', another proposition, Q that is incompatible with P.2 It is only in that case that 
claiming KP commits us to K~Q, which allows for the sceptical argument to proceed: if we 
cannot 'eliminate' Q, if we cannot claim to know that Q is false (~K~Q), we cannot claim to 
2   'The sceptical argument is ... just this: ... If you claim that S knows that P, and yet you grant 
     that S cannot eliminate a certain possibility in which not-P, it certainly seems as if you have
     granted that S does not ... know that P.'   [Lewis 1996, p564]
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know that P (~KP).  Dretske supplied many sceptical arguments of this sort: if we do not know 
that the animals we saw in the zoo are not mules in disguise (and we do not), then we do not 
know that they are zebras; if we do not know that it is not colored water in the bottle, we do not 
know it is wine; etc. ~K~Q is evidently true in these ordinary cases, so the only way to avoid 
scepticism, according to Dretske, is to reject the Closure Principle, which takes us from KP to 
K~Q, given that P entails ~Q.  
Only it is not “given” that P entails ~Q (that P and Q are incompatible). It is not true that 
any proposition has a proposition other than its negation (and equivalents) that is false if it is 
true. Propositions we ordinarily claim to know are indeed surrounded by propositions that are 
false instead of true, but the fact that a proposition is false when another is true does not mean 
that they are incompatible. (At most it means that one does not entail the other, not that one 
entails the negation of the other.) Some of these propositions that happen to be false must be 
false, given other things that we know, but apart from that, one empirical proposition, P, says 
nothing about another, Q. They are logically independent. It does not follow from the fact that 
the animals we saw in the zoo are zebras, that they are not mules in disguise; it only follows from
that fact plus the fact (among many others) that zebras are not mules. From the fact that it is wine
in the bottle it does not follow that it is not colored water; it only follows from that fact plus the 
fact (among others) that wine is not water. So when we claim to know such a thing as that it is 
wine in the bottle, we do not commit thereby to claiming that it is not colored water, because the 
one does not entail the other. If we do not know it is not colored water in the bottle—and 
ordinarily we do not—it does not follow that we do not know it is wine. All that follows is that 
we do not know either that it is wine or that wine is not water—and that is not grounds for 
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scepticism. (It is how knowing and not knowing work in a world of facts that are logically 
independent.) We can know something is wine without knowing it is not water (even if, as 
happens to be the case, wine is not water). We can know the animals we saw are zebras without 
knowing that zebras are not mules. We are simply ignorant of some general facts in each case; 
but ignorance is not grounds for scepticism, unless it is ignorance of something that we may be 
supposed to know (because of what we claim). Ignorance of general facts of nature does not 
undermine particular claims of knowledge. One might as well argue that because we do not 
know that all ravens are black that we do not know that the raven we see in front of us is black. 
Inductuve knowledge operates quite independently of deductive knowledge.
Claiming KP does not commit us to claiming that Q is false, if the conjunction of P and 
Q is false as a matter of fact, and not impossible. ~(P ‧ Q) → ((P → ~Q) v (Q → ~P)) might 
suggest otherwise: it is a tautology and seems to imply that if the conjunction of P and Q is 
(materially) false, then one conjunct must entail the other. It is one of the “fallacies” of material 
implication. The so-called paradox of material implication is that any false proposition 
(materially) implies, and any true proposition is (materially) implied by, any other proposition. It 
is not really a fallacy, of course, but it really is a fallacy to suppose that the (material) fact that P 
and Q are not both true entails that they are incompatible and that either entails the negation of 
the other. Observvation can indicate that the conjunction of P and Q is false, by presenting one 
without the other, but it cannot indicate that the conjunction is impossible. That goes beyond 
anything that we can observe. 
'Not-p' sceptics betray their scepticism by their circumspection. They doubt that we know
that the animals we saw in the zoo are zebras and not mules, that the stuff in the bottle is wine 
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and not colored water, etc.; they do not doubt that that the animals in the zoo are zebras and not 
elephants in disguise or airplanes, or that the stuff in the bottle is wine and not the Atlantic 
Ocean or the tail of a comet. Like everyone else they are constrained by acknowledged facts. If 
nothing is known, as they claim, anything is possible, and then it makes as much sense to doubt 
that the stuff in the bottle is wine and not water as to doubt that it is wine and not an interstellar 
cloud of gas or anything else. It makes sense to doubt something particular, P, via ~K~Q, only if 
one means something particular by 'Q' (Wittgenstein), ie. only if 'Q' stands for 'a certain 
possibility' and is not being used as a variable for any proposition whatsoever. Normal doubt is 
urging that it is not the case that KP since ~K~Q, on the grounds that (P and Q) is impossible, 
where the Ps and Qs stand in place of partiuclar propositions. The 'not-P' sceptical argument 
mimics ordinary, regular doubt, using variables instead of constants: we do not know that 
anything, P, is true, if we do not know that anything, Q, that entails not-P is false. As a general 
argument it is just the trivial claim that we do not know anything (variable) if we do not know 
that its negation (variable) is not true. 
Another way of getting the hyper-sceptical, second premise of AI* (~K~H → ~KP) is by 
CP from (P → ~H) and ~K~H (Dretske 2014, p16). Dretske thought that ordinary propositions 
like “here is a hand ...” (P) have 'heavyweight implications' like ~H, so that KP entails K~H by 
CP and, by contraposition, ~K~H entails ~KP. To avoid scepticism he urged rejecting CP, which 
fails, he maintained, because reasons for claiming to know such a thing as P do not “transmit” 
their warrant to its “heavyweight” implications (eg. 'we are not dreaming'). The problem is not 
CP, however; it is that ordinary propositions like P do not have 'heavyweight' implications like 
~H. (H entails ~KP, not ~P.) The reason 'we can't see that we are not dreaming' (as we can see 
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that 'here is a hand …') is that ~H is not an implication of P. That there is a hand here or a tree 
over there does not imply that we are not dreaming or deceived in any way. CP does not fail; it 
simply fails to apply where there is no valid implication. 
How do we get the spurious idea that (P → ~H)? (1) One way is to construct an 'H' that 
entails that P ('here is one hand …') is false per accidens. The 'brain-in-a-vat' version of H 
includes 'handless' in some renditions, so that P entails that we are not handless brains-in-a-vat, 
hence that we are not handless brain-in-a-vat deceived into thinking that we know that P.3 If then 
we are deceived in that way, P must of course be false—but the implication is per accidens, the 
result of mishandling the sceptical hypothesis, making it seem that H entails ~KP because it 
entails ~P (which entails ~KP). That is a distortion of the sceptical argument. It is not how it 
works. It is possible to be deceived into thinking that we have knowledge without supposing that 
something is so that is not so. (H entails ~KP, not ~P.) 
(2) The fact that KP entails both P and ~H makes it seem that either one entails the other. 
It is another “fallacy” of material implication. {(p → (q and r)} → {(q → r) or (r → q)} is a 
tautology, since the consequent is the disjunction of a material implication (p → ~H) and its 
converse (~H → p), which is a tautology; but it does not mean that one or the other of any two 
propositions entails the other—even if and when they are both consequents of the same 
proposition. The fact that something green is not blue and is also not red does not imply that 
what is not blue is not red (or v. v.); 10 is divisible by 2 and also by 5, but what is divisible by 2 
is not necessarily divisible by 5. KP implies both P and ~H, but it does not follow that either 
entails the other. The inference is tempting, however, when 'P' is a present-tense, indicative 
3 '... the proposition that I have hands implies that I am not a handless being, and a fortiori that I 
am not a handless being deceived by a demon into thinking that I have hands.' Lewis (1996) 564
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observation-statement, like the premise of Moore's proof. It seems to be indubitable, if true (P →
~H) or true since it is indubitable (~H → P). It seems that either 'this is a hand, so I cannot be 
dreaming (P → ~H)' or 'this is a hand unless (or else) I'm dreaming (~H → P)'. Knowing seems 
to connect the truth of what is known (P) with the negation of scepticism (~H). The illusion 
disappears when we distinguish the fact, which we know (KP), from the fact that we know in the 
sense that we are not mistaken (K~H). It is simply a matter of rejecting the second premise of 
AI* and not building the impossibility of error into the concept of knowledge. KP goes with 
~K~H (Moore's position at the end of PEW).
Dretske took some potshots at Moore ('hocus pocus', 'chutzpah, not philosophy') for 
claiming to know that 'here is one hand …', but not that he is not dreaming—as if Moore were 
not the last philosopher one would suspect of accepting (P → ~H) and the hyper-sceptical, 
second premise of AI* (KP → K~H) built on it (Dretske 2014, p38). In fact Moore claimed that 
he did not know that he is not dreaming (~K~H), not that he did know it. He anticipated that 
many people would be dissatisfied with his proof for that very reason. They wamt a proof of his 
premise, P, but to come up with a proof of P Moore thought he would have to prove that he was 
not dreaming (~H), which he did not think he could do. At the same time he did not think it 
necessary to make that argument to have a successful proof, since proofs require that premises 
only be known, not proved, and it is possible to know something (KP) without being able to 
prove it (~KKP), that is, without knowing that scepticism is false (~K~H). 
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